CFP: Conceptual Change in History
Conceptual Change in History
Conference at the University of Helsinki
September 22-24, 2016
Organised by
The Oulu Centre for Theoretical and Philosophical Studies of History
http://www.oulu.fi/
The research project ‘Reinventing the foundations of the European Legal Culture 1934-1964’
foundlaw.org
Keynote speakers
Theodore Arabatzis (University of Athens)
Martti Koskenniemi (University of Helsinki)
Sinai Rusinek (Van Leer Jerusalem Institute)
Benjamin Straumann (New York University)
Paul Thagard (University of Waterloo)
It is often suggested that
historiography deals with change in time. If nothing ever changed, it
would hardly make sense to do historical research. The nature of
conceptual change has been an object of acute interest
in recent years in the history and philosophy of science, cognitive
science,
Begriffsgeschichte, the history of ideas, legal history and other
fields. Although a seemingly simple notion, the term ‘conceptual change’
hides a complex set of questions and problems.
First,
‘conceptual change’ may be seen to imply a number of different claims.
It could mean a change of a particular concept or a replacement of that
concept by another. It could also refer to
the emergence of an entirely new concept. On the other hand, the
reappearance, circulation and mutable application of alleged ´perennial´
concepts in historical writing would seem to undermine the idea of any
abrupt ´change´ in conceptualizing history. Concepts
operate within their intellectual context, where issues such as
tradition have an impact within conceptual change and permanence.
Especially in normative contexts such as law and legal tradition,
concepts and their interrelationship take on a formative and
constructive character.
Second,
one is consequently entitled to ask what ‘change’ is in history.
Ultimately it is a question of how historians have understood
invariance, change and replacement in their texts. It
may appear that invariance is the prerequisite of variance. When we speak about a change of X, something
would need to stay unchanged. If there is no invariance whatsoever, the case would
appear to be that of a replacement of
X, rather than of a change. The problem becomes visible when one tries
to understand the emergence of an entirely new concept. Does it
presuppose discontinuity with respect to the tradition
that precedes it? Or does it rather imply continuity, as Collingwood
suggested: “Any process involving an historical change from P1
to P2 leaves an unconverted residues of P1 incapsulated within an historical state of things which superficially is altogether P2” (An
Autobiography, 2002, 141)?
Third,
how should the concept of concept be understood in the context of
historiography? That is, what is the anatomy of this tool of
representation? On the one hand, many different philosophical
traditions have put forward theories of concept, but often their
notions appear unsuitable for describing changes in history. On the
other, many schools of history deal with concepts, but they often define
them only vaguely or assume implicitly. Thus it is
necessary to ask, for example, what the relation of concepts to
language is and whether they should be seen as atomistic units or as
composable to smaller elements. In addition, contributions from
educational science, neurobiology and cultural studies challenge
historians to rethink whether concepts should be perceived as mental or
social entities. Sociolegal studies have challenged the normative value
and permanence of concepts and examined the way that change in
political, intellectual and legal contexts is reflected
in conceptual change.
We invite contributions on the topic of
Conceptual Change in History from both junior and senior
scholars and from various fields. The papers may deal with the semantic
problems of conceptual change: How should change, stability,
replacement and emergence of concepts in history be understood?
What kind of theory of concepts does historiography require?
Contributions may also address the question of the modelling of
conceptual change. What are the mechanisms of conceptual change and how
can they be presented? What is the relationship between concepts
and normative orders and such as law and legal culture? In addition,
papers may describe specific cases of conceptual change in history,
which illuminate some philosophical, legal and theoretical aspects of
conceptual change.
This international conference is
organized by the Oulu Centre for Theoretical and Philosophical Studies
of History and the research project ´Reinventing the foundations of the
European Legal Culture 1934-1964´. The three-day
conference hosts presentations by keynote speakers and additionally
invites submission for plenary papers.
Please email submissions to Heta Björklund (foundlaw@gmail.com) by March 31, 2016. The maximum length of abstracts is
300 words.