CfP: Truth and Falsity in Feminist Epistemology, Workshop in Freiburg, 6-7 August 2025

CFP: “Is that so? Truth and Falsity in Feminist Epistemologies”, Workshop at the Professorship for Epistemology & Theory of Science, UCF, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany, 6–7 August 2025

Confirmed participants include Linda Martín Alcoff (CUNY), Nadja El Kassar (University of Luzern) and Daniel Loick (University of Amsterdam).

“Situated knowledges” (Haraway 1988) and “strong objectivity” (Harding 1991: 138–163) are but two well-known conceptual innovations from feminist epistemologies. In fact, researchers in this field have not just submitted the basic concepts of knowledge and objectivity to ruthless criticism but have advanced innovative re-conceptualizations, Haraway’s and Harding’s among them. However, the closely related concept of truth has received less attention. There are important criticisms of sovereign conceptions of truth, i.e., of conceptions that rely on the infamous “god trick” of a view from nowhere and thereby presuppose the existence of a sovereign epistemic standpoint (Rouse 1996), locating truth beyond power and politics, beyond economic and social conflicts—and beyond all considerations of gender. Yet, with few exceptions (Gorham 1995, Alcoff 1996), there have been little sustained efforts from feminist epistemologies to re-formulate theories of truth or the concept itself in order to find a suitable non-sovereign re-conceptualization. Also missing are sustained arguments for or against retaining or abandoning the concept, as have been put forward for the concepts of knowledge and objectivity.

The workshop addresses this curious absence. We seek contributions interested in truth as a concept for/in feminist epistemologies. Questions that might be addressed include, but are not limited to:

  1. Should feminist epistemology theorize “truth”? Or can feminist epistemologists rely on standard theories of truth from outside the field?
  2. (How) Is truth gendered?
  3. How might a non-sovereign re-conceptualization of truth look like?
  4. Which theory or theories of truth—e.g., correspondence, coherence, deflationism, alethic pluralism etc.—is particularly (un)helpful for feminist epistemologies?
Please send abstracts (in English) of no more than 700 words to political_epistemology@ucf.uni-freiburg.de until January 10, 2025. Notifications of acceptance will be sent out by the end of February 2025. The workshop will take place in Freiburg, Germany, on 6–7 August 2025; travel costs and accommodation will be covered. If you have any questions, please contact Frieder Vogelmann at frieder.vogelmann@ucf.uni-freiburg.de.